A problem in studies of infallibility is whether the reasons for infallibility of one PERSON might be extended to ANOTHER PERSON without a warrant, or there should be a warrant for such extension. For example, can one extend the reasons for the full-fledged infallibility of Prophet Muhammad and Shiite Imams to past prophets and prove their full-fledged infallibility as well, while there is not warrant for this, and the relevant reasons only established the full-fledged infallibility of Prophet Muhammad and Shiite Imams? A consideration of issues concerning infallibility shows that certain reasons for infallibility are sometimes deployed outside of their proper scope and extended to other people with a cogent reason. Such a mistake sometimes occurs in deploying the reasons for the infallibility of one PERSON to prove the infallibility of ANOTHER PERSON and sometimes for rejecting the infallibility of a PERSON, instead of rejecting that of ANOTHER PERSON. This research aims to find gaps in studies of infallibility, showing certain errors that occur therein. We consider the problem with a descriptive and analytic method.

One of the issues related to criminal responsibility and the principle of its individuality is the criminal responsibility arising from the other’ s behavior that legislator has referred it as criminal responsibility arising from other’ s behavior in 142 article of Islamic Penal Law of 2013. This means that the criminal responsibility is on a PERSON who has not committed the crime, but is known responsible and punished due to specific conditions and based on the legislator's discretion. Before approving this law, the examples of this responsibility had been referred discretely in some laws. There is a concept called criminal responsibility of superiors (commander-ship) in the international documents that whereby military commanders or superiors are known responsible for crimes that were committed by forces under their command or control, in the lack of necessary control of their subordinates. This is one of the important issues in international criminal law and there are several reasons for its justification includes criminal responsibility arising from other’ s behavior. Accordingly, a separate study of each of these concepts and identification of their relationship is important, which is discussed in the present research through study theoretic principles and refer to regulations, texts and other documents. According to results in this study, criminal responsibility of superiors can be similar criminal liability arising from other’ s behavior in the internal law.

The crimes of kidnapping and concealment constitute two examples of crimes against PERSONs which in addition to depriving freedom and inflicting physical harm on the victim, violate the victim’s PERSONality. One article of Islamic Penal Law deals specifically with the crimes while several articles have a general relation thereto, and ample regulations can be found in Iranian Criminal Law arsenal which bear on the crime. But the crime has drawn little attention in legal literature. So, the paper attempts to examine general and specific elements of the two crimes, pointing to the present state of Laws and regulations in order to determine the abrogating and the abrogated or general and special among them. This takes a large section of the paper, since there exist many ambiguities in the field which require critical examination. Also dealt with are issues such as jurisprudential viewpoints, the relationship of the crimes with similar crimes like arbitrary detention, factors aggravating penalty, attempt to commit the crimes and suspension of sentence.

The property which is offered for sale and possessed by buyer is terminologically called makhuz belsaum, the possessor is called akhez belsaum and the act is called akh belsaum. Delivery of property by the seller to the buyer may be considered either offer or promise to sell. The author in this paper seeks to answer the following question: what is the liability of the possessor of property with regard to property damage while in his possession? A group of jurists believe that he acts in a fiduciary capacity while the others consider him liable. Some jurists maintain that his liability is contractual while the others consider his liability as tort liability. The above said opinions have been studied through analytical-descriptive method and it has been concluded that the possessor is considered to be in a fiduciary capacity with regard to the property in his possession for testing and it is against legal logic and unjustifiable to consider liable a PERSON who, by the owner's authorization possesses a property to test and verify and consider him as unauthorized possessor.

In Sartr's viewpoint, the relationship between the human beings id is hostile and devoid of any good intentions. To describe this relationship, he uses metaphor of "look" and says: "ANOTHER" tries to deprive me of my freedom by his look and make me his own slave by dominating me. Sartre calls God "absolute ANOTHER" and believes that the hostility ruling on the relationships of human beings is more acutely ruling on the relationship between God and human being as well. Since God, as absolute subject and look, Seizes human being's freedom and consequently his identity, then he changes him into an object. The article continues to deal with the critique of this viewpoint.

The problem of PERSONal identity among others may stem from the following question—what does be the PERSON that you are, from one day to the next, necessarily consist of? The diachronic problem of PERSONal identity raises question on the necessary and sufficient conditions for the identity of the PERSON over time. The synchronic problem is grounded in the question of what features or traits characterize a given PERSON at one time. To answer these questions, John Locke discarded the soul and the body as necessary and sufficient substances for PERSONal identity over time. He accepted consciousness as the only criterion for PERSONal identity; the only thing capable of remaining the same and preserving PERSONal identity through change. Though Locke’s argument is somewhat clear and coherent but what remains vague and incoherent is embedded in the question—what exactly is consciousness? How and why should it be the basis or criterion for the determination of PERSONal identity? Using the method of critical analysis, I argue that Locke’s choice of consciousness as the determinant of PERSONal identity, though quite novel, is incoherent and vague. Secondly, Locke had already presumed and anticipated clearly though fallaciously the very thing he wishes to substantiate. I therefore conclude that Locke’s argument is just ANOTHER way of trying to escape but inadvertently prolonging the difficulty of apparently articulating a distinction between the psychological approach and physiological approach to the problem of PERSONal identity. However, in my submission, I propose the concept of the “other” as alternative approach— a sort of an extrinsic-intrinsic approach to the problem of PERSONal identity.

Introduction: Infectious diseases, particularly the coronavirus, are among the critical public health and medicine issues that have significantly impacted all aspects of human life. One of the key factors in spreading and intensifying these diseases is the concealment and suppression of related information, which can have disastrous consequences for public health. This issue, besides its social, cultural, and economic dimensions, is also of particular importance from a legal and medical perspective. The present study examines the civil liabilities of individuals and legal entities in relation to CONCEALING infectious diseases such as the coronavirus. It analyzes the factors influencing the transmission and spread of diseases from medical and legal viewpoints. Conclusion: In jurisprudential and legal sources, various principles, including destruction (Etlaf), causation (Tasbib), and no harm (La-Zarar), are considered for civil liability, which applies to health and medical issues during pandemics. This research, using a descriptive-analytical method and utilizing library resources, the Holy Quran, and the latest jurisprudential and legal findings, explores the medical and legal obligations of individuals and legal entities in managing and preventing the spread of infectious diseases. Despite numerous studies in this area, this research presents an innovative approach to examining responsibilities in the medical and legal context. It demonstrates that Ja'fari jurisprudence, with its flexibility and dynamism, provides specific and well-reasoned jurisprudential and legal solutions to prevent the concealment and suppression of diseases and protect public health.